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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
 
No. 09-4042
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
     v.
JARROD A. ROSS,
                      Appellant
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-06-cr-00003-002)
District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
        
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 4, 2010
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed _June 7, 2010)
         
OPINION OF THE COURT
         
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
Jarrod A. Ross (“Ross”) appeals his sentence imposed by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  Because we conclude that the District
Court’s sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, we will affirm.
     We affirmed Ross’s original sentence in an earlier appeal.  United States v. Ross,1
No. 06-4148, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13243, at *2 (3d Cir. June 23, 2008).
2
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we offer only a brief recitation of the facts
to provide context. 
On May 24, 2006, Ross pled guilty to a one-count indictment for conspiring to rob
a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  The District Court imposed a sentence of
twenty-one months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release.  1
Ross was released to supervision in June 2007 and, by March 2008, Ross’s probation
officer had filed a Petition on Supervised Release charging several release violations. 
Ross failed to appear at the hearing and the District Court issued a bench warrant.  At a
subsequent hearing, which Ross attended, the District Court revoked Ross’s supervised
release and imposed a sentence of six-months’ imprisonment to be followed by an
additional thirty months of supervised release.  Ross was released in October 2008 and,
by April 2009, his probation officer had filed a second Petition on Supervised Release
alleging substantially similar violations of the terms of release.  Ross again failed to
appear for the scheduled hearing date and the District Court again issued a bench warrant. 
On October 1, 2009, Ross appeared before the District Court for sentencing.  The
District Court heard argument from the parties and acknowledged receipt of a letter from
Ross.  He did not dispute that he had violated the terms of his release; instead, he
     The District Court imposed the maximum term of imprisonment permitted under2
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) for Grade C violations of supervised release.  The statutory
maximum is two years, but because the court had already sentenced Ross to six months
for his first violation of supervised release, only eighteen months remained under the
maximum.  
3
requested a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range and below the statutory maximum
based on the nature of his release violations and his personal circumstances.  The court
imposed a sentence of eighteen months’ imprisonment with no supervised release.   Ross2
timely appealed this sentence.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and the
authority to revoke supervised release under § 3583(e).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).  See United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540,
542 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review a sentence imposed for violations of supervised release
for reasonableness.  See id.  If procedurally sound, we will affirm the sentence “unless no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d
558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
III.
We engage in a procedural and substantive review of sentences.  See id. at 567. 
Procedurally, the District Court must (1) correctly calculate the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range; (2) formally rule on the motions of both parties and state on the record
     These factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the3
defendant’s history; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the crime, adequately deter
criminal conduct, protect the public, and provide training or medical care; (3) the
available sentences; (4) the established sentencing range; (5) any pertinent sentencing
policies; (6) the need to avoid sentencing disparities; and (7) the need to provide
restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7).  
When the sentence is imposed for violations of supervised release, § 3583(e)
refines the statutory factors for consideration.  See Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543 n.2.  As such,
the sentencing court may, but need not, consider the available sentences and the need for
restitution.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
     Ross bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness at both stages.  See4
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.  There is no presumption of reasonableness even if the sentence
is within the Guidelines range.  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329-30, 331-32
(3d Cir. 2006).
4
whether the court is granting a departure and how that departure affects the guidelines
range; and (3) consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)  and adequately3
explain the chosen sentence in a manner that allows for meaningful appellate review of
the reasonableness of the sentence.  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007);
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 
Substantively, we must be satisfied that the District Court exercised its discretion
by considering all of the § 3553(a) factors and we must also ascertain whether those
factors were reasonably applied to the circumstances of the case.   See Tomko, 562 F.3d at4
567; Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543.  The record must demonstrate that the sentencing court
gave meaningful consideration to all of the § 3553(a) factors, but the court need not make
a finding for each factor if the record makes clear that the court took the factors into
account in sentencing.  See United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 546, 547 (3d Cir.
     Ross has appealed only the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his5
sentence.  Therefore, we will focus exclusively on those elements.  See Olhovsky, 562
F.3d at 546-47. 
5
2009).  Further, we will affirm if we are convinced that the final sentence, wherever it
may lie within the statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious
consideration of the relevant factors in light of the circumstances of the case.   Bungar,5
478 F.3d at 563 (citing United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)).  
It is clear to us from the record that the District Court followed the procedural
guidelines and gave more than meaningful consideration to the relevant § 3553(a) factors. 
Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence of eighteen-
months’ imprisonment.  Ross takes particular issue with the court’s finding that he was
“not superviseable,” and contends the court failed to consider his personal circumstances.  
 He relies primarily on our decision in Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, for this latter point.    
First, based on his record of repeated violations, the court did not clearly err in
agreeing with the Government that Ross is “not superviseable.”  See Tomko, 562 F.3d at
567-68 (stating that sentencing court abuses its discretion if it relies on a clearly
erroneous finding of fact).  Second, the court explicitly acknowledged that it read and
reflected on Ross’s letter, which laid out the personal circumstances he contends the court
failed to consider.  See also Bungar, 478 F.3d at 546 (“[A] district court’s failure to give
mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they deserve [does not] render[] the
sentence unreasonable.”).
6
Finally, our decision in Olhovsky does not compel a different result in this case
because a thorough review of the record reveals the District Court performed the requisite
consideration of the sentencing factors and does not suggest the court ignored or over-
emphasized any factors.  See Olhovsky, 562 F.3d at 547.  Moreover, we do not read the
sentencing transcript to reveal “that the district court was so appalled by the offense that it
lost sight of the offender.”  See id. at 549.  Rather, if anything, the District Court was
appalled by Ross’s history of violations and refusal to comply with the terms of his
supervised release, as well as his repeated breaches of the court’s trust.  See United States
v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he theory behind sanctioning violations of
supervised release is to sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking
into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the
criminal history of the violator.” (quotations omitted)).  In this instance, we are satisfied
that the District Court focused on the individual offender rather than just the offense.  See
Olhovsky, 562 F.3d at 549.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence.
